The Mind of the Universe. Evolutionism, Cosmology and the End of Knowledge

Luis E. Echarte, MD, PhD

Department of Biomedical Humanities.
School of Medicine.
University of Navarra

 

One controversial idea that Richard Dawkins develops in his book The Extended Phenotype is that non-adaptive processes are not relevantly implied in the propagation of living beings and other replicators –for example, success cultural phenomena–. For Dawkins, natural selection is the main key of all theory about dynamical stability. Moreover, he defends that the supposed benefit of phenotypic traits is not necessarily addressed to its carrier. In this context, knowledge, either considered as replicator (or group of replicators of its kind) or phenotypic trait is not always profitable for mankind. From this perspective, it is deducible that scientists have to maintain a pragmatic and cautious attitude toward learning. Oppositely, Artigas presents in his work The Mind of Universe a reality in which are exhibited rationality, information and creativity, here the main justification of dynamical stability. Furthermore, all these non-accidentally aspects seem to link entities in a harmonious whole like if the universe would have a directive and benevolent mind that looked for the well-being in everything. Coherently, in this cosmologic worldview investigators are be able to access data, perform analyses and formulate theories trusting and hopping for its activity. In this paper I contrast the pragmatic assumptions of Dawkins’ evolutionism with Artigas’ cosmology, concretely focusing on the relation between scientific progress and social advantages. Artigas share with Dawkins the idea that some natural traits or phenomena can be only understood looking around its environment. However, according to the Spanish philosopher, first, in such comprehension, carriers are not leave out –in other words, traits may be “transcendent to” but not “independent of”–, and second, all allusion to advantages and disadvantages make sense only in reference to ontological roots. That last is an important difference because, due to what is good is always good relative to a certain kind, it is not possible to establish non relativistic moral criteria from evolutionism. The conclusions and consequences of Dawkins’ scheme are not trivial. Researchers need but cannot be prudent, and, because the end of knowledge is just not the same for everyone, neither only just one community is possible but multiple and ideological ones. Briefly, assuming Dawkins’ point of view implies to admit that both scientific progress and social advantages are unavoidable restrained. On the contrary, the classical worldview defended in Artigas’ thought does not require a guideline for avoiding any kind of truths, only honesty, main agreement and strength of our still united scientific community. Summarising, paraphrasing his words, because “the meaning of science is twofold: pursuit of truth and service to humankind”, science and society are capable to advance freely and cooperatively.