Scientific Naturalism and the Need for a Neutral Metaphysical Framework
Dr. Robert A. Delfino
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
St. John's University
In recent years there has been much controversy over the relationship between science and religion. One of the forces driving this controversy is the fact that many scientists and philosophers of science have defended the view that scientists work within a naturalistic framework. Indeed, the distinguished United States National Academy of Sciences has stated that “Science is a way of knowing about the natural world. It is limited to explaining the natural world through natural causes.” Naturalism, however, has both metaphysical and methodological dimensions and we must carefully distinguish between the two.
Metaphysical naturalism is a view that denies the existence of supernatural entities. Usually this view amounts to a kind of materialism and therefore it denies the existence of non-material beings such as God. However, as Mariano Artigas has argued correctly in his book The Mind of the Universe: Understanding Science and Religion, it is a mistake to think that metaphysical naturalism is “a part or consequence of science” (page 11). While many scientists and philosophers of science have conceded this point, they have, nonetheless, argued that science presupposes methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism is an epistemological principle that governs how science is practiced. It prohibits the use of supernatural explanations in science. However, unlike metaphysical naturalism, methodological naturalism does not make any claims about the existence or non-existence of supernatural entities. Even though methodological naturalism is not the same as metaphysical naturalism, it still adds a type of metaphysical bias to science. This is because methodological naturalism limits the metaphysical categories one can use in scientific explanations. And this, unfortunately, can lead to unwarranted reductions in science.
In this paper I argue that what scientists really need is a neutral metaphysical framework—one that does have an a priori commitment to materialism or non-materialism. The advantages of a neutral framework are the following. First, such a framework would avoid unwarranted reductions in two ways. On the one hand, scientists would be allowed to posit new metaphysical categories if the evidence gathered warranted it. This strengthens science because it allows scientists to follow the evidence wherever it leads, which is in harmony with a realistic conception of science. On the other hand, a neutral metaphysical framework would also help scientists to better recognize when they have hit a boundary and thus must defer to other disciplines such as philosophy or theology. Third, as the last point makes clear, such a framework would help to alleviate at least some of the problems currently hindering dialogue between science and religion. For example, such a neutral framework should be acceptable to both atheists and theists and it should also allow for greater interdisciplinary work between scientists, philosophers, and theologians. In defending my proposal for a neutral metaphysical framework for science, I draw on the metaphysics of Jorge J. E. Gracia in his book Metaphysics and Its Task: The Search for the Categorial Foundation of Knowledge.