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The role of models and presuppositions in science and theology
Video:
John Byl, Ph.D.
Professor and Chair
Department of Mathematical Sciences
Trinity Western University
This paper discusses the role of worldview presuppositions in the acquisition of scientific and theological knowledge. Both types of knowledge exhibit similar structures. In science we distinguish between observational data, inferences made from the data, and theoretical models that explain the data; in (biblical) theology we similarly distinguish between biblical assertions, inferences made from these, and theological models that explain (cf. Marc Cortez). Models may be metaphors, analogies, or simplified representations of a limited aspect of reality (cf. Ian Barbour). They serve as conceptual frameworks that can lead to further scientific or theological insights and discoveries.
The same data can often be explained by many competing models. Hence the criteria for ranking models are often largely extra-observational, based primarily on subjective, philosophical factors. Ultimately, we prefer models that best reflect our basic beliefs about how the universe functions. Models are thus strongly worldview dependent. They bridge the gap between our worldview beliefs and the reality that we actually experience.
Consequently, the knowledge acquired through models is influenced by our prior presuppositions as to, for example, ontology, epistemology, God and his interaction with the universe. It is important to be aware of the limitations of models (cf. Nieuweland); one must not confuse a model of reality with reality itself.
Knowledge claims of science and theology may overlap (e.g., R.J. Russell notes that Big Bang eschatology challenges the biblical doctrine of a bodily resurrection). Thus one's set of worldview presuppositions should be broad enough to provide a coherent framework for a mutually complementary science and theology.
Often, contrary knowledge claims reflect not a clash is between science and theology as such but, rather, between competing two worldviews. Currently, the two major western worldviews are naturalism and theism. These have quite different presuppositions regarding such fundamentals as ontology, causation and epistemology.
As stressed by David Griffin, one's worldview presuppositions must be able to account for such things as common sense, the activity of scientists and theologians, and the acquisition of knowledge. Knowledge entails the existence of a purposeful knower, a reliable mind, objective truth, and absolute rational values and logical laws. The rational defense of some forms of naturalism (e.g., the materialist reductionism of Francis Crick) is self-refuting if it implies the existence of entities (e.g., a purposeful mind) that the worldview explicitly denies. Theism, on the other hand, provides a sufficiently rich metaphysics and epistemology that can credibly explain the full range of reality, including particularly the nature and condition of humanity.
References
Russell, Robert John 2002. “Bodily Resurrection, Eschatology and Scientific Cosmology" in Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments Ted Peters et al (eds.).
Barbour, Ian G. 1974. Myths, Models and Paradigms.
Nieuweland, G.Y. 2000. "Do Mathematical Models Tell the Truth?" Nieuwe Archief voor Wiskunde 5/1: 406-411.
Cortez, Marc 2005. "Contextual theology and the nature of theological discourse". Westminster Theological Journal 67:347-362.
Griffin, David R. 2000. Religion and Scientific Naturalism.